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Suppose a plaintiff files suit in state court against a state official in their official
capacity. The complaint includes both claims arising under federal law and not
subject to the Eleventh Amendment' and claims that could be heard by the federal
court were they not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.2 The defendant petitions
for removal of the case to federal court because the district court has, at the least,
federal-question jurisdiction. After the State's petition is granted pursuant to
§ 1441,' it immediately files a motion to dismiss those claims barred by the
Eleventh Amendment as the federal court is without jurisdiction.
Prior to the recent decision in Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht,4
the district court had two choices. When the suit contained any claims barred by the
Eleventh Amendment, the approach of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits had been to
remand the entire action to the state court from which it was removed.S On the other
hand, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits allowed the district court to remand to state court
those claims barred by the Eleventh Amendment and to hear those claims not
affected by the Amendment. 6
In Schacht, the plaintiff, a former correctional officer, brought § 1983' claims
against the Wisconsin Department of Corrections and some of its employees in state
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drafts of this Note. Special thanks to my parents, William and Patricia Krider, for their constant
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1. Examples of such claims not subject to the Eleventh Amendment include those seeking
prospective, injunctive, or declaratory relief against a state regarding its policies or programs, or
individual-capacity damage claims against state officials for alleged civil rights violations. See
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664, 666 (1974); Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155, 167
(1908).
2. Examples of claims barred by the EleventhAmendment include those naming a state or
state agency, see Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n,
450 U.S. 147,150 (1981); official-capacity damage suits against state officials, see Ford Motor Co.
v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459,468 (1945); or state law claims under supplemental
jurisdieion,see Pennhurst State Sch. &Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,121 (1984) (Pennhurst
fl).
3.28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994).
4. 118 S. Ct 2047 (1998).
5. See Frances I. v. Wright, 19 F.3d 337,343 (7th Cir. 1994); McKay v. Boyd Constr. Co.,
769 F.2d 1084,1087 (5th Cir. 1985).
6. See Kruse v. Hawaii, 68 F.3d 331,335 (9th Cir. 1995); Henry v. Metropolitan Sewer Dist,
922 F.2d 332,338 (6th Cir. 1990).
7.42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. ]11996).
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court.8 Pursuant to § 1441(a),9 the defendants removed the case to federal court.
Though the district court dismissed the claims barred by the state's Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity and granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's
judgment for Jack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment."0
Furthermore, it instructed the district court to remand all claims back to the state
court from which the case came." Upon review, however, the Supreme Court did
not decide whether or not the defendant State's invocation of the district court's
removal jurisdiction indicated a waiver of the state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity.
Part I of this Note will discuss the relevant background information involved in
the Eleventh Amendment, including what constitutes an effective waiver of the
Amendment, and removal jurisprudence. This groundwork will provide the tools
for the analysis. Part II will then discuss the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Schacht, regarding the issue of whether or not the existence of claims barred by the
Eleventh Amendment requires remand of the entire action or just those claims so
barred. Finally, Part III will analyze the implications of the Kennedy concurrence
in Schacht and conclude that a petition for removal should be equated with a state's
effective waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND
REMOVAL JURISDICTION
A. Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment has been a source of constant conflict and complexity
in the federal courts since its ratification in 1789.12 The Eleventh Amendment
states: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." 3
However, the Court's interpretation of this Amendment has not been confined to the
8. Schacht v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections, 116 F.3d 1151, 1152 (7th Cir. 1997).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994). "[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the
district cours ofthe United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or
the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the
place where such action is pending." Id.
10. See Schacht, 116 F.3d at 1154.
11. See id.
12.See, e.g.,LAUREN CEL TRIBB, M iCAN CONSTrtUTONALLAw 173 (2d ed. 1987) (The
history of the Eleventh Amendment is riddled with "complex and often counterintuitive
interpretations... that have made the amendment far more controversial than its language would,
on its face, suggest'); John 3. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity
A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1889, 1891 (1983) ("The eleventh amendment today
represents little more than a hodgepodge of confusing and intellectually indefensible judge-made
law.').
13. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI.
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plain-meaning of its text. Though its language appears rather explicit, the Court has
expanded the Amendment's meaning beyond its specific text.
The Amendment was originally enacted in direct response to the Supreme Court's
decision in Chisholm v. Georgia.' The Chisholm Court found federal jurisdiction
existed over a cause of action brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the
State of Georgia."5 Because of the unpopular implications of the decision, Congress
swiftly responded with the Eleventh Amendment. 6
Hans v. Louisiana" exemplifies the Court's expansive treatment of the
Amendment. Despite the wording of the Amendment, the Hans Court concluded
that the it barred suits against a state by its own citizens as well as those by non-
citizens.' The Court wished to avoid the
anomalous result... [whereby] in cases arising under the Constitution or laws
of the United States, a State may be sued in the federal courts by its own citizens,
though it cannot be sued for a like cause of action by the citizens of other States,
or of a foreign state; and may be thus sued in the federal courts, although not
allowing itself to be sued in its own courts. 9
The Court treated the Eleventh Amendment as constitutionalizing the state's
sovereign immunity and creating a broad limitation on the federal court's
jurisdiction." The Supreme Court has repeatedly followed the reasoning in Hans
by treating the Eleventh Amendment as a limitation on a federal court's subject-
matter jurisdiction in many subsequent decisions.2 '
Judges and scholars have advocated at least two other theories in an attempt to
define the meaning and scope of the Eleventh Amendment. Justice Brennan pursued
the argument that the Eleventh Amendment was only meant to bar actions brought
under a federal court's diversity jurisdiction and not its jurisdiction arising under
14.2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
15.Id. at 420.
16. In fact, the amendment was introduced to the Senate within two days after the Chisholm
decision was handed down and finally ratified two years later. See JoHN V. ORT, Th JuDiciAL
PowaoFimUnIED STATES: THEELEvENmAME NM r NAMBCAN HISTORY 20-21 (1987)
(discussing the history of the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment).
17. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
18.Id. at 18.
19.Id. at 10.
20. See ERwIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICrION § 7.3, at 375-77 (2d ed. 1994).
21. See, e.g., Ataseadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,238 (1985) (stating that the
Eleventh Amendment is a limitation on judicial authority under Article H); Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,119-20 (1984) (defining the Amendment as a constitutional
bar against claims that would normally be within the federal court's jurisdiction); Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,678 (1974) ("The EleventhAmendment... sets forth an explicit limitation
on federal judicial power.. . .") (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S.
459,466-67 (1945)); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18,25 (1933) ("The Eleventh Amendment is
an explicit limitation of the judicial power of the United States."). But see Calderon v. Ashmus,
118 S. Ct 1694,1697 n.2 (1998) (noting the Court's recognition that the Eleventh Amendment
is not "co-extensive with the limitations on judicial power in Article IF) (citing Idaho v. Coeur




questions of federal law.' Though Justice Brennan's diversity theory was the basis
for his majority opinion in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,23 Justice Brennan's
reasoning has never been accepted by more than three other members of the
Court.24
Additionally, some scholars view the Eleventh Amendment merely as the re-
establishment of common law sovereign immunity.2" Advocates of this theory
believe the Eleventh Amendment was enacted to reverse Chisholm and reenact state
sovereign immunity.26 The Eleventh Amendment was not meant to act as a
constitutional bar. Therefore, like common law immunity and unlike subject-
matter jurisdiction, the State can waive its immunity from suit.2" However, the
language of the Amendment indicates it is in fact a limitation on the power of the
federal courts.29
Again, though the language may suggest otherwise, the Court expanded a state's
sovereign immunity by barring suits in admiralty in Ex Parte New York.3 In
accordance with the expansion in the Hans decision, the Court reasoned that the bar
could not "with propriety be construed to leave open a suit against a State in the
admiralty jurisdiction by individuals, whether its own citizens or not."3
The Supreme Court has also gone beyond the plain-meaning in limiting the scope
of the Eleventh Amendment. In Ex Parte Young,3 2 the Court held that the Eleventh
Amendment did not bar suit in a federal court against a state officer where the
plaintiff was seeking injunctive relief for violations of federal law.3 In what many
22. See, e.g., Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 509-16
(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 276-77,287 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Though the diversity theory was never accepted by a majority of the Court, it is worth noting that
Justice Brennan came within one vote of a majority in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S.
1 (1989). Justice White in concurrence wrote, "I agree with the conclusion reached by Justice
Brennan. . . , although I do not agree with much of his reasoning." Id. at 57 (White, J.,
concurring).
23.491 U.S. 1 (1989). However, the Court explicitly rejected the diversity theory of Union
Gas in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,66 (1996).
24. The diversity theory was embraced by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens in Welch,
483 U.S. at 496 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
25. See Martha A- Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines:
Part One, 126 U. PA. L. RnV. 515, 538-49 (1978). Actually, Justice Brennan originally advocated
this theory. See, e.g., Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 309-22 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
26. See CHBEMRINsKY, supra note 20, § 7.3, at 378 & n.17.
27. See, e.g.,Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 258-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]here
simply is no constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity").
28. See infra Part I.B.
29. See CHEMhRINsKY, supra note 20, § 7.3, at 379.
30. 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921). The Supreme Court also found the Eleventh Amendment
applied to suits brought by a foreign country against one of the states. See Principality of Monaco
v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 321-30 (1934). However, this Note will not address that aspect of
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.
31. Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. at 498.
32.209 U.S. 123 (1908).
33. See id. at 168.
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scholars have defined as a legal fiction,34 the Court concluded that when a state
officer acts in opposition to the Federal Constitution he is effectively stripped of his
official capacity making him, and not the state, liable for his actions." Since the
state is not the defendant, a federal court is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment
from hearing the claims filed."
The reach of Ex Parte Young was refined by the Court's holding in Edelman v.
Jordan.3' The Court found an action brought against a state officer seeking
retroactive, rather than prospective, relief was barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.3 Specifically, and of particular concern to the analysis at hand, the
Court found the lower court incorrectly held "the Eleventh Amendment .. .
constitute[d] a bar to that portion of the District Court decree which ordered
retroactive payment of benefits found to have been wrongfully withheld. '39 As a
result of the Edelman decision, a plaintiff is limited to prospective injunctive relief
when suing a state defendant.4"
B. Waiver of Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Perhaps one of the most interesting and perplexing aspects of the Eleventh
Amendment is the states' ability to waive it. In this respect, the Eleventh
Amendment differs from a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction, which can
never be waived.41 But, like subject-matter jurisdiction, the Eleventh Amendment
immunity can be raised for the first time on appeal.
42
Eleventh Amendment immunity can be waived in one of two ways. First, the
Court will find a state's waiver of immunity "only where stated 'by the most express
language or by such overwhelming implications from the text [of a federal statute]
as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction."' 43 The intention of
Congress to do so must be "unmistakably clear" in the statutory language.44 Second,
Congress may abrogate a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment.
45
34. See, e.g., TRIME, supra note 12, at 189; 13 CH Rs ALAN WiGc-r ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICRAND PROCBDUR § 3524, at 154 (2d ed. 1984); Gibbons, supra note 12, at 1891.
35. See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60.
36. See id.
37.415 U.S. 651 (1974).
38. See id. at 678.
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. See id. at 677.
41. SeeAmericanFire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6,17-18 (1951); Mitchell v. Maurer, 293
U.S. 237,244 (1934); 13 WRIGHTTAL., supra note 34, § 3522, at 6.
42. See, e.g., Edelman, 415 U.S. at 678 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,
323 U.S. 459,467 (1945)).
43. Id. at 673 (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909) (second
alteration in original)).
44. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,242 (1985).
45. See Filzpatick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,456 (1976); cf. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44,57-73 (1996) (holding that Congress does not have the power to abrogate a State's sovereign
immunity under the Commerce Clause).
10231999]
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Clearly, the test for deciding whether or not there is an effective waiver is a
stringent one." For example, the fact that a State has waived its immunity to suit in
state court does not necessarily imply that the State has done so in regard to federal
court as well.47 In order for a State to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity and
thereby subject itself to suit in federal court, its intention must be explicit." "[The
Court] require[s] an unequivocal indication that the State intends to consent to
federal jurisdiction that otherwise would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment."49
Similarly, the Court has refused to uphold congressional abrogation of a state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity where it is not unequivocally expressed in the
statute passed by Congress."0
C. Federal Removal Jurisdiction
When a suit is filed in state court, the defendant has the option of removing the
case to federal court under the district court's removal jurisdiction if the federal
court would have had original jurisdiction had the claim originally been filed
there."' This statutory conferral of jurisdiction was originally created in the
Judiciary Act of 1789.2 The Supreme Court has since upheld the constitutionality
of the federal courts' jurisdiction in removal actions as encompassed within Article
I, Section 2 of the Constitution. 3 And, since its final revision in the Judiciary Act
of 1887, removal jurisdiction has remained virtually the same. 4
One oft-cited purpose behind the creation of removal jurisdiction was Congress's
concem that a nonresident defendant be protected from the prejudice of a local state
46. SeeAtascadero, 473 U.S. at 241.
47. See id; PennhurstState Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,99 & n.9 (1984) (citing
FloridaDep't ofHealth v. FloridaNursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981) (per curiam));
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 677 n.19 (stating that whether a State allows suit in its own courts is not
determinative ofwhether or not Eleventh Amendment immunity has been waived in federal court)
(citing Chandler v. Dix, 194 U.S. 590, 591-92 (1904)); FordMotor Co., 323 U.S. at 465-66.
48. SeeAtascadero, 473 U.S. at 241; Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436,441 (1900).
49.Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 n.1.
50. See, e.g., Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979) (stating that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lacks
sufficient evidence to establish Congress's intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity).
51. The statutes granting this right are located in Chapter 89 of the Judicial Code. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1441-1452 (1994 & Supp. H 1996).
52. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79.
53. The text ofArticle HI, Section 2 reads in pa4t, "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases,
in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority." U.S. CoNsT. art. IlL § 2; see also City of
Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 833 (1966); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257,261-62
(1879) (holding that the Constitution grants Congress the power to authorize removal); 14B
CHARLES .ALAN WRIGHT ETAL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3721, at 285-88 (3d ed.
1998).
54. Judiciary Act of 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat 552, corrected by Act of August 13, 1888,
ch. 866, 25 Stat 433. The 1887 statute raised the jurisdictional amount, limited the right of
removal to defendants, and barred removal when the defendant relied on federal law as his or her
defense. See id. § 2, at 553.
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court.55 "The existence of removal jurisdiction reflects the belief that both the
plaintiff and the defendant should have the opportunity to benefit from the
availability of a federal forum." '56 Another concern removal addressed was the
avoidance of piecemeal litigation by allowing a case containing both federal and
state claims to be removed by the defendant to federal court,"
The availability of a federal forum to a defendant sued in state court is not
absolute. Of primary importance is the requirement that the district court have
original jurisdiction over the action.' Thus, a federal district court can only hear a
claim removed from state court if it originally could have been filed in the federal
court, had the plaintiff chosen to do so."' The district court, therefore, must have
either federal-question jurisdiction60 or diversity jurisdiction61 over the civil
action.62 If the district court's original jurisdiction is based on the existence of a
federal question, the right of removal extends to all defendants.63 This, of course,
is where the question of the Eleventh Amendment and removal is of particular
55. Se4 ag., Thermton Prod., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336,341 (1976); 14B WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 53, § 3721, at 289 & n.7; Mitchell N. Berman, Note, Removal and the
Eleventh Amendment: The Case for District Court Remand Discretion to Avoid a Bifurcated
Suit, 92 MicH. L. Rnv. 683, 692 (1993).
56. CI-MERINSKY, supra note 20, § 5.5, at 323.
57. See David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1988 and 1990 Revisions ofSection 1441, in 28
U.S.C.A. § 1441, at 6-13 (West 1994).
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994); see also City of Chicago v. International College of
Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156,163 (1997); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386,392 (1987).
59. See, e.g., West v. MissouriBd. of Law Exam'rs, 520 F. Supp. 159,160 (ED. Mo.), aff'd,
676 F2d 702(8th Cir. 1981) (holding thatthe removal statute does not grant an independent basis
for federal court jurisdiction, but rather allows for removal where original jurisdiction already
exists).
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Id.
61. See id § 1332 (1994 & Supp. 11996). The statute reads in part, "[tihe district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between... citizens of different States."
Id. § 1332(a).
62. A case is not removable from state to federal court based on a federal defense. See Rivet
v. Regions Bank, 118 S. Ct. 921,925 (1998). "'[T]he presence or absence of federal-question
jurisdiction is governed by the 'well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal
jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly
pleaded complaint."' Id. (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392).
63. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) ("Any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States shall be removable'without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties.").
10251999]
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concern to our analysis.64 Congress has also provided certain areas where the
plaintiff's forum choice is the only available forum.6"
Similarly, there are specific instances in which a defendant may have a right of
removal regardless of whether or not the district court has original jurisdiction."
Whatever the basis for the notice of removal, the defendant always bears the burden
of proving removal was proper.67
The procedure for removal is rather simple." In order to remove the case, all of
the defendants in the action must consent.69 Once the defendant files a notice of
removal, the state court can no longer hear the action until the federal court
remands it back.7" The plaintiff thus challenges removal by filing a motion to
remand.7
II. WiSCONSiN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS V.
SCHACHT-THE ELEVENTH AMENDmENT BARS CLAimS, NOT
CASES
In much the way Congress has allowed federal courts to hear removed claims
originally filed in a state court, it has granted district courts the ability to "send
back" certain claims. Federal district courts are conferred with the power to remand
when dealing with various claims arising under federal law.72
First, a district court is granted some discretion in certain instances, including the
joining of both removable and nonremovable claims in one cause of action. Section
1441(c) states:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action within the
jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title is joined with one or more
otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be
64. However, itis likewise important to mention that if the case is removable only by invoking
federal diversityjurisdiction, a defendant cannot remove the case if any of the parties are a citizen
of the State where the action was originally filed. See id. ("Any other such action shall be
removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a
citizen of the State in which such action is brought').
65. See, e.g., id § 1445(a) (Supp. 11996) (action against a railroad or its receivers or trustees);
id § 1445(b) (action arising under workmen's compensation of a state). See generally 16 ROBERT
C. CAsAD ET AL., MooRa's FEDERAL PRAcncE § 107.17 (3d ed. 1998).
66. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (any action against a foreign state); id. § 1442(a)(1) (Supp.
111996) (prosecution or suit against a federal officer); id. § 1442a (1994) (against members of the
armed forces); id § 1443 (where defendant unable to secure federal civil rights in state court); id.
§ 1444 (actions in foreclosure against the United States).
67. See generallyid § 1441 (referring to the defendant or defendants as the party responsible
for filing and supporting the petition for removal); id. § 1447 (Supp. 1 1996) (same).
68. See id. § 1446 (1994 & Supp. 111996).
69. See Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245,248 (1900); 14C
WRIGHT ET.AL., supra note 53, § 3731, at 251, 258.
70. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d).
71. See id. § 1447(c).
72. See id. § 1441(c).
1026 [Vol. 74:1019
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removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its
discretion, may remand all matters in which State law predominates. 73
The plain language of the statute allows a defendant to remove a case brought in
state court by joining a federal question claim to one which does not arise under
federal law."'
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Breyer rejected the approach of the Fifth
and Seventh Circuits75 in Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht.76 The
Court held that the presence of a claim barred by the Eleventh Amendment in an
otherwise removable cause of action did not destroy the jurisdiction of the federal
court." The district court is then left with the discretion to either remand the claims
unaffected by the Eleventh Amendment or hear the nonbarred claims. 71
A. Recent Supreme Court Precedent
In Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill,79 the Supreme Court determined that
a district court had the discretion to remand a case removed from state court after
all federal law claims had dropped out of the action."0 Arguing that remand of a case
barred from federal court is preferable to dismissal,"' the Court specifically noted
the language of § 1441(c). Congress, through the statute, allows a district court to
either adjudicate all claims in the suit or remand those which are independently
nonremovable.' The Court constantly refers to removal of individual claims based
on whether or not they alone are within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the district
court.
In City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons,"s the Supreme Court
recently addressed whether or not a district court had jurisdiction to hear complaints
based on both state and federal law." Looking to principles of pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction, the Court reasoned that a district court had jurisdiction if the state
claims shared a common nucleus of fact with the federal question issues raised in
the case." Rejecting the plaintiff's arguments, the Court found that the existence of
claims not within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the district court did not bar the
entire action when federal issues of law still remained. Rather, the district court was
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. This is precisely the situation the Fifth Circuit faced in McKay v. Boyd Construction Co.,
769 F.2d 1084, 1087-88 (5th Cir. 1985).
75. See supra text accompanying note 5.
76. 118 S. Ct. 2047,2051 (1998).
77. See id.
78. See id at 2054. InSchachft the case included only claims arising under federal law and not
state law claims. Id. at 2050.
79.484 U.S. 343 (1988).
80. See id. at 357.
81. See id. at 351-55.
82. See id. at 354.
83. 522 U.S. 156 (1997).
84. See id. at 159.
85. See id. at 164-65.
1999] 1027
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free to hear those claims well within the jurisdiction of the district court.8 6 This
supports the argument not only that a claim-specific approach is mandated, but also
that the existence of claims outside the subject-matter jurisdiction of the district
court did not divest the federal court of all subject-matter jurisdiction.
B. Background of Schacht
Schacht had been a prison guard dismissed by the Wisconsin Department of
Corrections for stealing various items from the prison facility where he was
employed." In response, Schacht brought several claims in state court under the
United States Constitution and federal civil rights laws against the Wisconsin
Department of Corrections and its employees. 8 The defendants then removed the
action to the federal district court. The answer filed in federal court included the
defense that, "the '[E]leventh [A]mendment to the United States Constitution, and
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, bars any claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against"' the state agency, the Department of Corrections, and the named
defendants in their official capacities. 9
In response, the district court granted summary judgment on those claims not
barred by the Eleventh Amendment against the individual defendants," and
dismissed those filed against the state based on the Eleventh Amendment.9' Though
Schacht's appeal only asserted that the district court's decision was legally
erroneous, the Seventh Circuit raised the issue sua sponte as to whether or not the
district court had jurisdiction to hear the nonbarred claims in the first place.92
The Seventh Circuit held that because the district court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over some of the claims, it therefore lacked jurisdiction over all the
claims, thereby making removal improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1441.9' The Seventh
Circuit looked to Frances J. v. Wright4 in concluding that § 1441 (a) only conferred
jurisdiction where "the district court has the authority to adjudicate all of the claims
in the case." 95 In Frances J., the Seventh Circuit interpreted the Eleventh
86. See id. at 165-67.
87. See Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 118 S. Ct 2047,2050 (1998).
88. See id. The complaint included claims under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause as well as violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). See Schacht, 118 S. Ct. at 2050.
89. Schacht, 118 S. Ct. at 2050.
90. These are the claims against the defendants in their "personal capacity." Id. (citing Schacht
v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections, No. 96-C-122-S (W.D. Wise. Sept. 13, 1996)). The district
court granted summayjudgment after finding Scbacht had not been deprived of due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
91. See id.
92. See Schacht v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections, 116 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1997).
93. See id. at 1152.
94. 19 F.3d 337 (7th Cir. 1994).
95. See Schacht, 116 F.3d at 1152 (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit rejected the
"futility" argument raised by the defendants in this case, stating that there was "no 'futility'
exception to § 1447(c)?'Id. at 1153. Section 1447(c) states: "If at any time before final judgment
it appears that the district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c) (Supp. H 1996). The Seventh Circuit in Schacht found the federal court is "not
free to disregard ajurisdictional defect' even if it would result in duplicate litigation in the state and
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Amendment as a limit on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal court rather
than a form of common law immunity.96 The Frances J. court had held that an
action containing claims barred by sovereign immunity barred a federal court from
hearing claims in whole or in part for lack of original jurisdiction.97 The Seventh
Circuit found that since the district court lacked original jurisdiction over the
action, due to the bar imposed by the state's sovereign immunity, the case was
improperly removed from state court minus an explicit waiver.9"
The Frances J. court found the real issue to be the federal court's removal
jurisdiction as granted by statute.9 Reasoning that the district court lacked
jurisdiction unless it could have heard the claim had it originally been filed in the
district court,10e the Seventh Circuit directed the district court to remand the entire
action to the state court from which it came.' 0'
In further support of their decision, the Seventh Circuit invoked various policy
arguments. 02 First, it cited the premise that state courts are as capable as federal
district courts to hear questions arising under federal law."0 3 Second, it found that
state courts have jurisdiction concurrent with a lower federal court in hearing suits
invoking federal law."' Finally, the Seventh Circuit found that concerns of judicial
economy encourage remanding entire actions rather than taking a claim-specific
approach. 15
C. The Reasoning of Schacht
The Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in holding that
the existence of an Eleventh Amendment-barred claim did not automatically destroy
federal court systems. Schacht, 116 F.3d at 1153.
96. FrancesJ., 19 F.3d at 340.
97. Id. at 341.
98. See id at342. The Supreme Court has found awaiver of a state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity by either Congress's abrogation or a state's "unequivocal expression" within its statute.
SeeAscadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,238-41 (1985). Of essential importance to
the analysis at hand is the generally accepted view that merely filing a motion or notice of removal
is not an effective waiver ofa state's sovereign immunity unless the Attorney General or other state
official is granted such powers expressly in the state statute. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v.
Department of Treasuiy, 323 U.S. 459,466-67 (1945); Silver v. Baggiano, 804 F.2d 1211, 1214-
15 (11th Cir. 1986) ("[R]emoval by state officials of a suit containing state law claims to federal
court does not amountto waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity unless those state officials are
authorized to waive such immunity."); Gwinn Area Community Sch. v. MIchigan, 741 F.2d 840,
846-47 (6th Cir. 1984).
99. The Seventh Circuit agreed that the McKay court did not erroneously read Hans to bar
federal jurisdiction over actions, rather than claims, even though it does go against the reasoning
inPennhurstff, which consistently refers to the Eleventh Amendment's bar of claims, rather than
actions. See Frances J., 19 F.3d at 341; see also text accompanying supra notes 5,17-21.
100. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994).
101. SeeFrancesJ., 19 F.3d at 343.
102. See id. at 341.
103. See id. (citing Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816)).




the federal court's original jurisdiction over the entire action." 6 As a result,
removal to the district court was proper, and the district court could hear and decide
the nonbarred claims."0 7
In support of the Seventh Circuit's decision, Schacht raised three arguments. All
three were rejected by the Supreme Court. First, Schact posited that an action
containing federal law claims joined with a claim barred by the Eleventh
Amendment was a different situation than when a cause of action included questions
arising under both federal and state law."' Schacht argued that when federal and
state claims are joined, the state claims fall within the federal court's supplemental
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)."0 9 On the other hand, where federal claims
are joined with an Eleventh Amendment-barred claim, the federal claims are not
within the court's pendent jurisdiction."' The Supreme Court rejected this
argument.
Second, the Court rejected Schacht's argument that the Eleventh Amendment
acted as a limit on a federal court's jurisdiction."' If the Eleventh Amendment acts
as an affirmative limitation on federal jurisdiction, a district court could never be
given the power to hear such claims under the Constitution."'
Finally, Schacht's analogy to removal jurisdiction based on diversity jurisdiction
was rejected."' In prior cases, the Court had found removal improper where even
one claim against a nondiverse defendant existed."4 The Schacht Court, however,
rejected this analogy. The presence of a nondiverse party automatically destroys the
original jurisdiction of the federal court."' This is different, however, from an
Eleventh Amendment defense. Unlike the Eleventh Amendment, the federal court
must raise the lack of diversity sua sponte, thus making it unwaivable." 6 The
Eleventh Amendment grants a defense to a state, but does not automatically destroy
the federal court's jurisdiction."7
Concluding that the Eleventh Amendment bars claims and not actions, the
Schacht Court next looked to the specific statutory language of the remand statute,
§ 1447(c)."' "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded."" 9 Schacht argued
106. See Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 118 S. Ct. 2047,2052 (1998).
107. See id. at 2050.
108. See id. at 2051-52.
109. See id. at 2051; 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1994). The Supreme Court cited City of Chicago
v. International College ofSurgeons, 118 S. Ct. 523, 529-30 (1997), in support of this argument
See Schacht, 118 S. Ct. at 2051.
110.SeeSchacht, 118 S. Ct. at 2051.
111. See id. at 2052.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. (citing Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68-69 (1996)).
115. See Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702
(1982) (comparing and contrasting personal jurisdiction with federal subject-matter jurisdiction).
116. See Schacht, 118 S. Ct. at 2052; Insurance Corp. oflr., 456 U.S. at 702.
117. SeeSchact, 118 S. Ct. at2052-53; Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,241
(1985).




that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the entire case once the Eleventh
Amendment was raised and as a result, § 1447(c) requires remand of the entire
case. The Court found instead that the district court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over only those claims barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and not over
the entire cause of action. 2 As a result, only the claims so barred had to be
remanded to the state court. The claims unaffected by the Eleventh Amendment did
not fall under § 1447(c)'s mandatory remand.12 1
The purpose behind § 1447(c) also defeats Schacht's interpretation. Because
§ 1447(c) deals with procedure after removal, it is focused more on the differences
between defective removals based on subject-matter jurisdiction than those that are
defective because of procedural oversights. 2 2 Such a situation was not at issue in
Schacht.
Alternatively, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits had looked to the plain language of
the removal statute in their reasoning. Under § 1441 (c), if one claim falls within the
federal-question jurisdiction of the district court then the entire cause of action,
including those claims which are not removable, may be removed to federal
court.' 2 The district court is also granted the discretion to remand "all matters in
which State law predominates."'' Congress thus grants federal courts the discretion
to hear the entire case or else to remand the independent, non-removable claims.
Though the statute does grant the federal judge discretion to remand those claims.
in which state law outweighs federal concerns,1 25 it speaks nothing of those issues
which are removable and primarily a matter of federal law. 126 Therefore, by looking
to the plain language of the statute, Congress did not grant the district court the
discretion to remand or decline to hear those claims over which it possessed
federal-question, subject-matter jurisdiction. This conclusion is consistent with the
Article III duty of federal courts to hear those claims over which it has
jurisdiction. 12
Because removal jurisdiction is purely an act of Congress, it is necessary to first
look at the language of the statute which establishes it in the context of Schacht.
Suppose a plaintiff files a § 1983 claim in state court which is then removed to
federal court pursuant to the state defendant's motion under § 1441(a). A consistent
reading of the reasoning in McKay and Frances J. results in the barring of a civil
rights action containing federal claims sufficient to invoke the court's federal-
120. See Schacht, 118 S. Ct at 2054. The Court declined to discuss whether or not Eleventh




123.28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1994).
124.Id.
125. But see Berman, supra note 55, at 700-01 (concluding instead that when a defendant
removes a civil action joining a federal question claim to a separate and independent claim which
is barred bythe EleventhAmendment the district court must remove the entire action and remand
the barred claim).
126. See supra note 1.
127. See U.S. CONST. art. IR § 2, cl. 1.
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questionjurisdiction as well as its supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367,"' thus
defeating the purpose of the statute. Rather than defeating the statute's purpose, the
court should allow removal of those portions of the civil rights action over which
the federal court has jurisdiction so as to allow a plaintiff a forum for the
vindication of its rights.
Of further importance is the need to clarify what constitutes a "civil action" as
described in the removal statute.129 Is it referring to a case with various claims or,
in the alternative, is it referring to each of the individual claims? By looking to the
language in other statutory grants of jurisdiction, we see that the use of the word
"action" is perhaps too broad of a term.
"Cause of action" is not synonymous with "case." For example, in the
supplemental jurisdiction statute, 3 the language of the statute confers a district
court with jurisdiction over any claims "so related to claims in the action" that they
"form part of the same case or controversy."' Because both words exist
independently in the same statute, we can infer that the terms are not
interchangeable and that "civil action" is meant to refer to any claim brought
against a party. For purposes of removal and Eleventh Amendment analysis, each
claim should, as a result, be reviewed on an individual basis. The finding that one
claim is barred, would not bar the entire case from federal court. Specific to the
facts in Schacht, this allows the district court to remand those claims barred by
sovereign immunity and grant summary judgment (or proceed to trial on the merits)
on those federal questions over which federal law predominates.
The Eleventh Amendment acts as a bar to certain claims arising under federal
law. However, that does not deny a district court from hearing other claims
unaffected by a state's sovereign immunity. Removal is appropriate where a federal
court has original jurisdiction by the existence of one claim establishing as much.
Therefore, if some of the claims within one action are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment and others are not, the federal court should remand those claims barred
by the Eleventh Amendment to the state court in which they were filed, citing lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction. However, the district court should hear those claims
within its subject-matter jurisdiction as questions of federal law are raised.
On the other hand, if the claims effectively barred by the Eleventh Amendment
were the only ones upon which subject-matter jurisdiction could be grounded, then
once they are barred, the entire action must follow. Based primarily upon the
language of the statute and Supreme Court precedent, the district court currently has
the jurisdiction to hear those claims not barred by the Eleventh Amendment despite
the existence of others which are not within federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994). The pertinent text of the statute reads:
in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district
courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same
case or controversy under Article IlI of the United States Constitution.
Id. § 1367(a).
129. See id. § 1441(a).
130. See id. § 1367.
131. Id. (both emphasis added).
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The Supreme Court's decision in Schacht is a narrow one. Its holding only
declares that the presence of a claim barred by the Eleventh Amendment does not
destroy the original jurisdiction of the federal court. As a result, the district court
can either hear the non-barred claims or remand the entire action. The Court refuses
to decide whether or not the Eleventh Amendment itself is a matter of subject-
matter jurisdictionM132 Finally, the Court did not address whether or not the petition
for removal can be considered a waiver of the state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity. Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, addressed the possibility of such an
interpretation.
III. JusTic KENNEDY'S WAIVER THEORY
Though Justice Breyer spoke for a unanimous Court, Justice Kennedy filed a
concurring opinion.133 Specifically, Justice Kennedy addressed whether or not a
defendant State expressly waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity by removing
the case to federal court, thus voluntarily invoking the federal court's jurisdiction. 3 '
In addressing this issue, it is necessary to consider the history of Eleventh
Amendment waiver and removal jurisdiction.3
Because removal requires the consent of all defendants,136 once the State consents
to removal, arguably it waives its Eleventh Amendment defense. It seems rather
anomalous to allow a defendant to remove a case, invoking federal jurisdiction, and
then argue to the federal court that it lacks that same jurisdiction because of the
Eleventh Amendment The "law usually says a party must accept the consequences
of its own acts."137 In this respect, Justice Kennedy equates the Eleventh
Amendment to personal jurisdiction. Under the law of personal jurisdiction,
generally, a party expressly waives any arguments against the jurisdiction of the
court upon filing in the federal court. However, Supreme Court precedent seems to
indicate that a state does not waive its immunity by merely appearing in a suit. 38
In fact, a state may raise the Eleventh Amendment defense for the first time on
appeal. 139 In this respect, the Eleventh Amendment acts as a limitation on the
federal courts' subject-matter jurisdiction. 4 ' Kennedy argues that the better
132. See Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 118 S. Ct 2047,2054 (1998).
133. See id. at 2054-57 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
134. See id at 2054. The Court did not address this issue directly in its opinion because it was
not raised by either party. See id. As a result, Justice Kennedy advocates considering the issue in
a later case. See id.
135. See supra Part L
136. SeeSchacht, 118 S. Ct at 2057 (Kennedy, J., concurring); supra text accompanying note
69.
137. Schacht, 118 S. Ct at 2055 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
138. See, e.g., id.; Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,678 (1974).
139. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99; Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S.
670,683 (1982);Edelman,415 U.S. at 678; Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S.
459,467 (1945).
140. See Schacht, 118 S. Ct. at 2055 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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approach would be to treat the Eleventh Amendment more like a waiver of personal
jurisdiction.141
Justice Kennedy's analysis is not without precedent. "[W]here a State voluntarily
become[s] a party to a cause and submits its rights for judicial determination, it will
be bound thereby and cannot escape the result of its own voluntary act by invoking
the prohibitions of the Eleventh Amendment.' 42 Specifically, in Clark v. Barnard,
the Supreme Court found that an appearance by the defendant State waived any
Eleventh Amendment immunity concerns. 143 The Clark Court equated Eleventh
Amendment immunity with a personal privilege granted to the states. As a result,
if the state appeared in federal court it was a "voluntary submission to [the federal
court's] jurisdiction.' 144
CONCLUSION
In consideration of both statutory analysis and Supreme Court precedent, the
removal statute, when considered in the context of the Eleventh Amendment,
advocates a review of each claim. Unlike the methodology used in the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits, the district court would effectively not be divested of its ability
to hear other claims arising under federal law. This claim-specific approach allows
for the district court to balance the sovereign immunity concerns of a state against
those of the federal government in determining which claims are properly
determined in a state forum, and which are better decided by the federal court.
Finally, such a concurrent reading of the Eleventh Amendment and removal
jurisdiction effectively equates a petition for removal with a waiver of the Eleventh
Amendment defense.
141. See id.
142. Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200 U.S. 273,284 (1906).
143. 108 U.S. 436,447-48 (1883).
144. Id. at 447.
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